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OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from
judgments of conviction and sentence entered against two
defendants in the District Court in which the government’s
case relied heavily on the testimony of an undercover
informant. After the jury found defendants guilty at the trial,
a state grand jury indicted the informant in an unrelated
matter on charges of child rape and other heinous sexual
3

crimes. Once defendants learned about the informant’s
indictment, they sought a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
The District Court denied their request and they now appeal to
this Court. For the reasons we give in this opinion, we will
affirm the District Court’s order denying the motions for a
new trial. We also reject defendants’ individual challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence, the procedure used in
sentencing, and the substantive sentence imposed.

II. BACKGROUND
German Quiles and Maria Quiles, husband and wife,
owned Aruba, Inc., a money-servicing business operating as
“Aruba Check Cashing and Auto Tags” in North
Philadelphia.1 Their daughter Gloria Quiles also worked at
Aruba Check Cashing and served as the company’s secretary.
The company offered services such as money wires, money
orders, and check cashing. The business was subject to
federal regulations relating to money laundering with German
Quiles being responsible for its compliance with these
regulations.

A. The Government’s Investigation

1

German Quiles was the president of the company and Maria
Quiles was its co-president. Gloria and German Quiles were coowners of the property.
4

In July of 2006, the government began an investigation
into possible money laundering at Aruba Check Cashing.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Steven
Galambos, who relied on an undercover informant named
Hector Ayala, led the investigation. Galambos instructed
Ayala to enter Aruba Check Cashing and identify himself as a
drug dealer’s assistant who needed money laundered, making
sure to ask for the name of the employee assisting him. For
each visit, Galambos gave Ayala a bag full of small bills and
told Ayala to request large bills, money orders, and wire
transfers. Ayala could offer up to 10% of the money that
Aruba was laundering as a “fee” in exchange for the
laundering. After he exited the store, Ayala told Galambos
what occurred, and Ayala’s recitation would be confirmed by
a recording device that Galambos had concealed inside
Ayala’s jacket or pants pocket. Ayala turned over the newly
laundered bills, money orders, and wire transfer receipts to
Galambos.
Operating under Galambos’s instructions, Ayala
entered Aruba Check Cashing as a confidential informant 30
different times.2 On his first visit Ayala explained his
criminal purpose, and on the remaining visits he brought
money for laundering or picked up laundered money. Ayala
reported that German Quiles, Maria Quiles, and Gloria Quiles

2

Some transactions took multiple visits to complete. The
government charged 16 independent acts of money laundering
between September 20, 2006, and January 12, 2007. The parties
laundered several thousand dollars during each transaction for
a total of $175,900.
5

all performed money laundering transactions for him while
knowing that they were helping to launder drug money.
Ayala also reported that the Quileses accepted “fees” well
above normal for the type of transactions involved in their
services.3 When Ayala delivered the laundered money to
Galambos he gave him a summary of the events that occurred
in Aruba Check Cashing. Unfortunately, Ayala’s recollection
is the best evidence of what had taken place inside Aruba
Check Cashing as the recordings produced from the hidden
recording device are of extremely poor quality and entire
sections of them in some instances are inaudible. However,
there are some audible incriminating statements on the tapes.
E.g., Supp. App. 75 (Ayala states that he has “drug money”);
id. at 68 (man Ayala identifies as German Quiles asks if
Ayala wants “money laundry, money” [sic]).4

B. Trial and Conviction

3

The District Court in its opinion denying defendants’ motions
for an acquittal stated that “Ayala was paying defendants
extraordinary fees. A typical customer at Aruba paid no more
than $.99 per money order, but Ayala was paying hundreds of
dollars for the same service.” United States v. Quiles, No. 07391, 2008 WL 3561618, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2008)
(citations to trial transcript omitted).
4

The conversations were in Spanish but were translated to
English for the jury.
6

After the government concluded its investigation, a
grand jury charged German Quiles, Maria Quiles, and Gloria
Quiles with conspiracy to commit money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count One) and 16 separate
acts of money laundering or aiding and abetting money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1956(a)(3) (Counts
Two through Seventeen). Defendants pled not guilty and the
case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the government’s case rested primarily on the
testimony of three witnesses. The first witness, IRS employee
Ted Cunningham, explained the money laundering
requirements that applied to Aruba Check Cashing.
Galambos was the second witness and he recounted the
details of his investigation and his interactions with the
undercover informant. Galambos, however, could not testify
about most of what had occurred inside of Aruba Check
Cashing because he remained outside the business during
Ayala’s excursions. The government called Ayala as the third
of these witnesses. Ayala described his actions and gave a
step-by-step analysis of the events that his hidden device
recorded. For example, Ayala explained where he was
standing in the store and identified the voices heard on the
recordings. He also testified to non-verbal actions that
defendants took, such as smiling or nodding, and to
unrecorded conversations such as his introduction to German
Quiles at which Ayala explained that he was there to launder
drug money.
It is obvious that Ayala’s testimony was essential to
the government’s case. Without his explanations, the secret
recordings would have been barely usable snippets of sounds
7

and partial conversations.
Understandably, therefore,
defendants built their strategy around discrediting Ayala.
Thus, in his opening statement, the attorney for German
Quiles told the jury they would see an informant “run amok,”
by accusing innocent people in order to get paid. App. at 260.
The government, in contrast, stated that Ayala had worked as
a confidential informant for over 20 years, doing “good, old
fashioned” undercover work. Id. at 252. The trial focused on
this chasm.
The jury returned its verdict on January 17, 2008,
convicting German Quiles and Maria Quiles on all the counts
charged. The jury, however, found Gloria Quiles not guilty of
conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count One) and of
ten specific acts of money laundering (Counts Two through
Eleven). But it convicted her of the remaining six specific
acts of money laundering (Counts Twelve through
Seventeen). Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal or
a new trial but the District Court denied their requests on
August 13, 2008, in an order entered on August 14, 2008.
United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2008 WL 3561618 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 13, 2008).

C. Post-Trial Events
Soon after the District Court denied defendants’ posttrial motions for acquittal or a new trial, a grand jury in
Pennsylvania indicted Ayala on multiple counts of statutory
sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a
minor under the age of 13 years, and other similar crimes.
8

After learning of Ayala’s indictment, all three defendants
moved for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.5 On
February 24, 2009, the District Court denied defendants’
motions in an order entered on February 25, 2009, holding
that the new evidence was inadmissible impeachment
evidence. United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2009 WL
466283, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2009).
The District Court then sentenced defendants. The
Court calculated a guideline sentence for German Quiles of
78 to 97 months based on a guideline offense level of 28 and
a criminal history category of I. German Quiles, however,
requested leniency, contending that he had led an exemplary
life, worked for many years, served in the national guard and
in public office, and was 70 years old and infirm. The
government, in contrast, emphasized that money laundering is
necessary for drug dealing to survive, a fact German Quiles
apparently understood. On February 25, 2009, the District
Court sentenced German Quiles to a custodial term of 60
months to be followed by three years of supervised release
and it imposed a $100,000 fine on him.
The Court
subsequently sentenced both Maria Quiles and Gloria Quiles
to terms of five years on probation with six months of home
confinement.6

5

Maria Quiles filed the motion and the other defendants joined
in it.
6

Inasmuch as Maria Quiles and Gloria Quiles or for that matter
the government did not appeal from their sentences, we will not
discuss their sentencings any further. In fact, Maria Quiles did
9

German Quiles and Gloria Quiles now appeal to this
Court asking us to reverse the District Court’s order of
February 24, 2009, denying their Rule 33 motions for a new
trial. In addition, Gloria Quiles argues that the evidence was
not sufficient for her conviction and asks us to reverse the
District Court’s order of August 13, 2008, denying her motion
for a judgment of acquittal. Finally, German Quiles argues
that the sentence the Court imposed on him on February 25,
2009, was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We
now will refer to German Quiles and Gloria Quiles as
“appellants,” excluding Maria Quiles who has not appealed.

III. JURISDICTION
The District Court had jurisdiction because the
indictments charged violations of federal criminal law. 18
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction because appellants filed
timely notices of appeal after their conviction and sentencing.
28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Interest of Justice Does Not Require a New Trial

not appeal at all.
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Rule 33 provides that a district court “may vacate any
judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so
requires.” There are five requirements that must be met
before a court may grant a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence:
(a) the evidence must be in fact newly
discovered, i.e. discovered since trial; (b) facts
must be alleged from which the court may infer
diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the
evidence relied on must not be merely
cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be
material to the issues involved; and (e) it must
be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new
trial, the newly discovered evidence would
probably produce an acquittal.
United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d
1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985)).
When the District Court denied appellants’ motions for
a new trial on February 24, 2009, it gave two reasons for its
decision. First, the Court said that the newly discovered
evidence regarding Ayala would not produce an acquittal
during a new trial because it would not be admissible.7 When

7

In a sense the new evidence to the extent that it was the
returning of the indictment against Ayala was not newly
discovered. Rather, it was newly created. See Saada, 212 F.3d
at 216. Nevertheless, we will treat it as though it was newly
11

the Court made its ruling, Ayala had not been convicted of his
crimes and the evidence likely would have proven too
inflammatory to be admitted.
See Fed. R. Evid. 609
(impeachment of witness allowed using evidence of
conviction of crime) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Evid. 403
(evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
Second, the Court said that the newly discovered evidence
was mere impeachment evidence and thus could not form the
basis for granting a new trial “under the plain language of
Saada.” Quiles, 2009 WL 466283, at *4.8 At the same time,
the Court distinguished a case in which another court granted
a new trial solely on the basis of impeachment evidence. See
United States v. Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.J. 1976).
When distinguishing Lipowski, the Court noted that arguably
Lipowski may no longer be good law in light of Saada.

discovered.
8

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in not
conducting an evidentiary hearing on their motions. But we
reject this contention as they did not request such a hearing in
the District Court and even if they had they would not have been
entitled to it as the Court adjudicated the matter on bases not
requiring resolution of a factual dispute at an evidentiary
hearing. In any event, even now we see no issue that an
evidentiary hearing could have resolved as we are deciding the
case on the basis of a set of facts that treats Ayala as having
committed and having been convicted of the sexual offenses for
which the state charged him.
12

We think that we should focus on the District Court’s
second reason for denying the new trial because its first
reason has lost some of its persuasive power inasmuch as five
months after the District Court issued its February 24, 2009
opinion denying a new trial, a state jury convicted Ayala of
the offenses charged against him.9 Convictions, unlike
indictments, may be admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, and the bare fact of a conviction is normally
not so inflammatory that it should be excluded under Fed. R.
Evid. 403. Moreover, we see no reason why after Ayala’s
state conviction appellants could not have filed new Rule 33
motions in the District Court seeking a new trial though they
did not do so.10 Thus, we will focus on the permanent, not
transient, features of the Court’s decision.11

9

Of course, we realize that the District Court ruled on the basis
of the facts at the time of its decision denying the new trial
motions as it did not have a crystal ball and thus could not
foresee the outcome of the state proceedings. It is significant
that the state court trial at which the jury convicted Ayala took
place after appellants were convicted and sentenced and had
appealed to this Court. The appeal terminated the District
Court’s jurisdiction to consider a new trial motion. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33(b)(1).
10

After appellants appealed Rule 33(b)(1) would have required
them to move for a remand in this Court to the District Court to
file new Rule 33 motions.
11

The District Court jury returned the verdict on January 17,
2008, and it therefore appears that the three-year window for a
13

1.

Standard of Review

A determination of whether it should grant a new trial
is left to the discretion of a district court. United States v.
Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we
normally review a district court’s determination of a new trial
motion under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.
United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“We will reverse a denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence only if we conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in denying the
motion.”). At certain points, however, the District Court
suggested that it was bound as a matter of law to deny
appellants’ Rule 33 motions. See Quiles, 2009 WL 466283,
at **2, 4 (noting the “requirements” of Saada and then
denying defendants’ motions because “the plain language” of
Saada required it to do so). Also, when ruling on a later
motion to stay appellants’ sentences pending appeal, the
District Court referred to its earlier Rule 33 decision and
stated, “[t]he Court’s exercise of discretion . . . in ruling on
the defendant’s Rule 33 Motion, was cabined by controlling
precedent—the Federal Rules of Evidence and Third Circuit
case law.” United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2009 WL
764306, *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2009). To the extent that we
are reviewing a legal rather than discretionary decision of the
District Court, we will apply a de novo standard of review.

new trial motion under Rule 33(b)(1) is still open. We,
however, do not say definitively that it is open as none of the
defendants have filed another motion for a new trial and there
might be other procedural bars to such a motion.
14

But the distinction between the two standards of review
makes no difference on this appeal because we would affirm
the District Court exercising complete de novo review.

2.

The Evidence Relied on Must Not Be Merely
Cumulative or Impeaching

Appellants say that they are not relying on mere
impeachment evidence in seeking a new trial and thus our
opinion in Saada that we quote above does not require that we
deny them a new trial. Rather, they point out that when the
government hired Ayala as a confidential informant he signed
several statements acknowledging limitations on his conduct,
including one reciting that he was “not permitted to violate
any laws.” Supp. App. 1536–43.12 Appellants say that
Ayala’s false written pledge not to commit any crimes,
combined with his commission of serious crimes, demonstrate
that there was a sufficient basis for granting a new trial.13

12

The government introduced this signed statement at trial when
explaining the procedure for employing a confidential informant. (Of
course, the statement also served to bolster Ayala’s credibility.) The
government asked Ayala a few questions about the statement, but did
not spend much time addressing it.
13

We do not understand why we should categorize the agreement as
false merely because Ayala did not live up to his obligations under it.
To the contrary, it would seem that to show that an agreement was
false a party making that claim would have to demonstrate that the
person making the agreement intended to violate it when he made it.
15

Appellants admit that their new evidence could be classified
as impeachment evidence, but they assert that they
nevertheless are entitled to a new trial because the new
evidence “goes to the foundation of the government’s case.”
Appellant Gloria Quiles’s br. at 43–44.
We agree with appellants that in certain unusual
circumstances a court should not deny a new trial that a
defendant seeks on the basis of newly discovered evidence
merely because the evidence is impeaching in character. In
stating our limited agreement with appellants we observe that
Rule 33(a) as written permits courts to grant a new trial when
the interest of justice requires it and does not distinguish
between newly discovered circumstantial and direct evidence
as a basis for granting such a motion. Yet we recognize that
notwithstanding Rule 33’s language, there are opinions that
say that a court should not grant a motion for a new trial on
mere impeachment evidence. But these cases do not seem to
give enough significance to the wording of Rule 33 which, as
we have indicated, makes clear that the interest of justice
guides the courts on deciding Rule 33 motions and does not
suggest that a court should distinguish between impeachment
and direct evidence in making that determination.
Though we recognize that Ayala may have had that very intent, we
are not aware of any evidence in the record supporting a conclusion
that he intended to do so other than his actual conduct. Moreover,
Ayala’s commission of crimes before the execution of the agreement
would not have made the agreement false as his agreement not to
violate any laws was prospective in nature. But we will not linger on
that point and instead will accept appellants’ characterization of the
agreement as false.
16

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that the court in
United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1991),
indicated that the statements that a new trial should not be
granted on the basis of newly discovered impeachment
evidence cannot
be taken at face value. Nothing in the text or
history of Rule 33 . . . supports a categorical
distinction between types of evidence; and we
cannot see the sense of such a distinction. If the
government’s case rested entirely on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness
who was discovered after trial to be utterly
unworthy of being believed because he had lied
consistently in a string of previous cases, the
district judge would have the power to grant a
new trial in order to prevent an innocent person
from being convicted. The ‘interest of justice,’
the operative term in Rule 33, would require no
less . . .
The judicial language that seems to
exclude impeaching testimony from the scope
of Rule 33 thus illustrates the tendency to
overgeneralize. It is easy to confuse a practice
with a rule. The practice has been to deny new
trials where the only newly discovered evidence
was impeaching. But the practice should not be
taken to imply a rule that even if the defendant
proves that his conviction almost certainly rests
on a lie, the district judge is helpless to grant a
new trial. District judges do not in fact consider
17

themselves helpless in such circumstances, and
they are right not to.
Id. at 415–16.
We agree with this statement from Taglia and we do
not believe that Saada requires us to reject it. District courts
do not and should not ignore a claim that there has been a
miscarriage of justice just because the newly discovered
evidence supporting the claim could be categorized as
impeachment in character. Taglia is not alone in recognizing
this point. E.g., United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 825
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In some situations . . . the newly-discovered
impeachment evidence may be so powerful that, if it were to
be believed by the trier of fact, it could render the witness’
testimony totally incredible.”); United States v. Leary, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 492 (D. Del. 2005) (“[T]here is precedent
indicating that impeachment evidence alone may sometimes
be a basis for a new trial.”); Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. at 868-69
(granting new trial after discovering key witness was
untruthful in closely related matters).
At the same time long experience has shown that
newly discovered evidence that is merely impeaching is
unlikely to reveal that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
There must be something more, i.e. a factual link between the
heart of the witness’s testimony at trial and the new evidence.
This link must suggest directly that the defendant was
convicted wrongly. See Saada, 212 F.3d at 216 (describing
this link as a necessary “exculpatory connection”). When this
connection is not present, then the new evidence is merely

18

impeaching and its revelation does not warrant granting a new
trial.14
When asked to grant a new trial solely on the basis of
new impeachment evidence, a court carefully should examine
whether the defendant has demonstrated the necessary
exculpatory connection between the evidence and the offense
or has demonstrated that the newly discovered evidence
totally undermined critical inculpatory evidence. And courts,
in practice, have done so. In Lipowski, the prosecution relied
on several tape recordings that the primary government
witness had made. After the trial, it was discovered that the
witness, in effect, had manufactured a tape recording that
threatened him and that he intended the threats to be attributed
to an unknown person. While this evidence did not prove that
the defendants had been convicted wrongly, and in any event
was not used at the trial, the court found it had “serious
implications regarding the truth and veracity of [the witness’s]
testimony” and the evidence “casts serious doubt over the

14

If a witness at the trial gave a physical description of the
criminal that matched the defendant but newly discovered
evidence from other persons who saw the crime gave a
completely different description of the same criminal, there
would be an exculpatory connection between the new evidence
and the charge. Of course, the mere presence of that connection
would not compel a court to grant a motion for a new trial, as,
among other bases for denying the motion, the court might
regard the new evidence as unreliable or might believe that other
evidence of the defendant’s guilt should lead it to deny the
motion.
19

authenticity of the tapes introduced into evidence.” Lipowski,
423 F. Supp. at 867-68.
Similarly, in Taglia the key government witness was
an FBI informant. After the jury convicted the defendants, it
was discovered that the informant had given false testimony
in an earlier case. The court of appeals in limiting earlier
cases indicating that a new trial cannot be granted on the basis
of newly discovered impeachment evidence, stated that a trial
court has discretion to grant a new trial when it is shown that
the witness “lied consistently in a string of previous cases.”
Taglia, 922 F.2d at 415. And in Davis, a jury convicted the
defendants on drug charges in part on the basis of testimony
of an undercover police officer. Some months later the same
officer was convicted of stealing drug money that the
government had confiscated as evidence. The court in Davis
said that “[i]f newly-discovered evidence establishes that a
defendant in a narcotics case has been convicted solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of a crooked cop involved in
stealing drug money, the ‘interest of justice’ would support a
new trial under Rule 33.” Davis, 960 F.2d at 825.15
In each of the cases that we have described, the courts
focused on what we believe was the correct question: was
there a strong exculpatory connection between the newly
discovered evidence and the facts that were presented at trial
or did the newly discovered evidence strongly demonstrate
that critical evidence at the trial against the defendant was

15

In both Taglia and Davis, however, the courts of appeals found
other reasons to affirm the convictions.
20

very likely to have been false? Of course, these standards
must be applied strictly and are not easily satisfied. In
Lipowski, the new evidence strongly suggested that the
conviction was based on fabricated evidence. In Taglia, the
new evidence showed that a key witness routinely committed
perjury when testifying as an informant, and because the
witness had testified in that capacity at the defendants’ trials,
there was great reason to doubt the validity of the convictions.
And in Davis, the new evidence showed that the primary
witness was a “crooked cop” who had been caught tampering
with (in fact, stealing) evidence.
The facts in these three cases can be contrasted with
those in Saada. In Saada, a witness named Rishty agreed to
testify for the government pursuant to a cooperation
agreement. Rishty later was caught on tape advising a friend
to give false testimony in exchange for a reduced sentence.
Obviously, this new information cast doubt on Rishty’s
testimony. If he had been willing to advise a friend to give
false testimony in exchange for leniency, would he not take
his own advice? Nonetheless, we found that the new
evidence offered in Saada was “only” impeaching, because
there was “no exculpatory connection” between the new
evidence and defendants’ criminal acts. 212 F.3d at 216.
Even though the new evidence greatly undermined Rishty’s
credibility, we felt that the exculpatory connection between
Rishty’s testimony and his advice to a friend in an unrelated
case was too tenuous to require granting a new trial.

21

We do not cite the preceding examples in an attempt to
define the exact “exculpatory connection” required.16 We
simply are emphasizing the question to be asked: is there a
strong exculpatory connection between the newly discovered
evidence and the evidence presented at trial or does the newly
discovered evidence, though not in itself exculpatory, throw
severe doubt on the truthfulness of the critical inculpatory
evidence that had been introduced at the trial. If the answer is
affirmative, then a defendant may be entitled to a new trial
even though he relies on evidence that could be classified as
“impeachment evidence.” If the answer is negative, then the
defendant is relying on mere impeachment evidence and will
not be entitled to a new trial on its basis. Determining the
strength and importance of the exculpatory connection or the
significance of the newly discovered evidence with respect to
the credibility of critical evidence given at the trial is a
difficult task that is left in the first instance to the discretion of
the district court.
In considering Saada we observe that we could not
have intended to hold that evidence germane only for
impeachment purposes never could be the basis for granting a

16

Indeed, there may be some tension between Saada and the
other cases. A reasonable person could say that the newly
discovered evidence in Saada was more damaging to the
government’s case than the newly discovered evidence in Davis
and Taglia. Of course, under our practice Saada sets forth the
controlling law in this Court. Third Circuit Internal Operating
Procedure 9.1.
22

new trial.17 In this regard, we posit the hypothetical of a
defendant discovering after a trial that the sole eye witness at
the trial who testified that the defendant committed the crime
was beyond any doubt in prison miles from the place of the
crime at the time of its commission.18 We think that
depending on what other evidence had been introduced at
trial, it would be reasonable to hold that Rule 33 would
authorize a trial court to grant a new trial in that situation even
though the newly discovered evidence in no way supported
the defendant’s claim of being innocent and thus there was no

17

We note that the government in effect acknowledges that our
view of Saada is correct because in its brief it recites that
“[w]hile this Court has not addressed this express issue, other
circuit courts have recognized that newly discovered
impeachment evidence may warrant a new trial in exceptional
circumstances.” Appellee’s br. at 43 n.22.

18

In point of fact the jury never would hear that the evidence that
the ersatz witness had been in prison at the time of the crime
because once the government learned that he had been there it
would not call on him to testify at a retrial. For that very reason
it is fair to say that, depending on what the other evidence was
of the defendant’s guilt, that the evidence of the witness’s
incarceration, though not introduced at a retrial, probably would
produce an acquittal at that trial as it would eliminate the eye
witness testimony of the defendant’s guilt.
23

exculpatory connection between the evidence and the facts at
trial.19

3.
The New Evidence Offered in This Case Is Merely
Impeaching
In the District Court, appellants argued that the jury
never would have believed Ayala if it had known he was a
convicted child rapist. See Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120
(5th Cir. 1977) (convictions show that the witness is unlikely
to have the normal witness’s respect for the necessity of

19

In this opinion, we have distinguished mere impeachment
evidence from evidence supporting the grant of a new trial using
a two-part question: is there an exculpatory connection between
the new evidence and the charge against the defendant or does
the new evidence destroy critical trial evidence? We include
this hypothetical to explain the second half of that question. The
newly discovered evidence in the hypothetical, devastating as it
would be, would not have an “exculpatory connection” to the
charge against the defendant and would not support an inference
that the defendant was not guilty of the charge against him. See
Saada, 212 F.3d at 216. Yet, clearly, the interest of justice
suggests that a new trial should be granted. Of course, we are
not implying that in our hypothetical the court would be
compelled to grant a new trial and would abuse its discretion if
it did not do so. In this regard, we point out that there might
have been evidence other than eye witness evidence of the
defendant’s guilt justifying the conviction.
24

giving truthful testimony because of his obvious disrespect of
the law). Appellants’ argument made it clear that their newly
discovered evidence was mere impeachment evidence and
thus, by definition, it is not a sufficient basis for a new trial.
In their appellate briefs and at oral argument,
appellants wisely attempt to focus on the negative effect that
the new evidence has on Ayala’s credibility and, therefore, on
his critical testimony.20 Appellants now argue that Ayala
repeatedly lied to the government while acting as a
confidential informant because he repeatedly but falsely
pledged not to commit any crimes. In appellants’ view, this
case is similar to Taglia, where a witness was shown to be a
serial liar when testifying in a certain capacity.
Notwithstanding appellants’ arguments, we find that
critical evidence has not been so severely weakened as to
justify granting a new trial.
Ayala has testified as a
confidential informant in three other cases. If it was shown
that he committed blatant perjury in these other cases then
there might be reason to doubt his testimony in this case.
Instead, appellants simply have shown that Ayala committed
crimes while working for the government, something he

20

Appellants acknowledged at oral argument that the focus of
their argument has changed somewhat as more facts have
developed. Now they focus less on Ayala’s bad character (as
shown by his heinous acts) and more on his direct history of
lying to the government. However, appellants did cite Lipowski
before the District Court, so they raised their argument
sufficiently to preserve it so that we can address it.
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promised not to do. This is too narrow a basis for granting a
new trial because a person signing a government agreement
and then violating its terms has engaged in a course of
conduct wholly different from that of a person fabricating
testimony. A showing that Ayala violated the terms of his
employment is not a sufficient basis to suggest that his entire
work as a confidential informant was a sham. Ayala’s
treatment of a young girl in violation of his terms of
employment, upsetting as it may be, has nothing to do with
the conversations that occurred inside Aruba Check Cashing.
See Quiles, 2009 WL 466283, at *5 (“[T]he crimes with
which Ayala is charged have absolutely no relation to his role
in the investigation or trial of defendants.”). This case
involves evidence different from the type of evidence we
discussed above regarding the imprisoned witness for the
evidence at issue here simply does not establish that Ayala
necessarily was untruthful at the trial in this case.

4.

Conclusion on the Rule 33 Issue

Appellants are not entitled to a new trial merely
because the principal witness adverse to them has turned out
to be a vile person. A practice supporting the granting of a
new trial when such a post-trial showing is made would not
be workable. How bad would the witness’s unrelated conduct
have to be before a new trial should be granted? What if
Ayala had been stealing cars instead of raping children? For
this reason, appellants here and defendants generally are not
entitled to a new trial solely on the basis of newly discovered
impeachment evidence.
However, if there is a strong
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exculpatory connection between the newly discovered
impeachment evidence and the charge against the defendant,
or if the new evidence totally undermines critical evidence of
the defendant’s guilt, then the newly discovered impeachment
evidence can serve as the basis for a new trial. But
impeachment evidence which lacks this connection —
evidence that is merely impeaching without an exculpatory
connection with respect to the charge against the defendant or
without undermining critical inculpatory evidence — will not
suffice. Whether our standard of review is de novo or abuse
of discretion, the evidence in this case is merely impeaching.
Therefore, the District Court correctly denied appellants’
motion for a new trial.

B. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Convict Gloria
Quiles
When evaluating a challenge to a jury’s verdict, we
apply a particularly deferential standard of review. United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). We do not
re-weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.
Id. (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir.
1996)). Instead, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government before deciding whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the presence of the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d
Cir. 1997)). In this case, our standard of review requires that
we view Ayala as a credible witness.
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Inasmuch as the jury acquitted Gloria Quiles on the
conspiracy charge (Count One) we examine evidence of her
personal involvement in every transaction of which she was
convicted. The evidence shows that Ayala spoke with Gloria
Quiles on October 19, 2006, and on December 6, 2006. On
both occasions, Ayala told Gloria Quiles that he was there to
launder drug money. For reasons that we do not know the
jury did not convict Gloria Quiles with respect to the charges
arising from the October conversation, but it nevertheless
convicted her of the six acts of money laundering occurring
on or after December 6, 2006 (Counts Twelve through
Seventeen). After December 6, Gloria knew Ayala’s purpose
and therefore the assistance she provided was sufficient to
convict her of aiding and abetting money laundering. See
United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming
conviction of friend who arranged drug deal, even though
friend was neither buyer nor seller).
The audio tapes confirm that Gloria Quiles was present
for transactions with Ayala on December 6 (Count Twelve),
December 7 (Count Thirteen), December 8 (Count Fourteen),
January 11 (Count Sixteen), and January 12 (Count
Seventeen). Although her interaction with Ayala may have
been minimal on some of these days, she knew Ayala was
laundering drug money and, by processing his transactions,
she was helping the venture to succeed and was participating
in it. See United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir.
1955) (“In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it
is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself
with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that
he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed.”) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
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613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769-70 (1949)) (internal quote
omitted).
The government acknowledges that on two of these
occasions Gloria Quiles told Ayala that he had to return later
if he wanted to complete his transaction. When Ayala did
return, someone else completed the money laundering
transaction. However, because Gloria Quiles knew that Ayala
was there to launder money, her admonition to Ayala to return
later was sufficient to support her conviction for aiding and
abetting. In short, she knew what Ayala was doing and
sought by her actions to help him succeed. On those days
when Gloria Quiles performed the transactions herself, she
structured them to avoid money laundering requirements.
With respect to the transaction on January 10 (Count
Fifteen) the evidence suggested that Gloria Quiles was at
Aruba Check Cashing, but did not interact with Ayala that
day. However, Ayala was unable to complete the transaction
that day and had to return the next day. When Ayala returned,
Gloria Quiles spoke to him about the money he had left the
previous day. This conduct was sufficient to show that she
had involved herself in the January 10 transaction after Ayala
departed.21
We see no basis to conclude that a reasonable juror
could not have voted to convict Gloria Quiles on the facts

21

Judge Smith believes that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction of Gloria Quiles on Count 15, and he
therefore dissents from this portion of the opinion only.
29

presented at trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, we cannot overturn the jury’s
verdict. Thus, we will affirm Gloria Quiles’s conviction in
full.

C. German Quiles’s Sentence Was Reasonable
German Quiles challenges the procedure used to arrive
at his sentence. He argues that the Court failed to consider
evidence suggesting that a lower sentence would have been
appropriate and failed to justify the sentence that it imposed.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (court should state the reasons for its
imposition of a particular sentence).
But the record
demonstrates that the Court was involved closely at every
stage of the trial and sentencing. The Court heard sentencing
arguments from German Quiles and from the government.
The Court then explained at some length why German Quiles
was being sentenced to 60 months imprisonment.
A
sentencing court need not analyze explicitly every argument
that a defendant puts forward. See Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (sentencing
court’s terse statement of reasons was sufficient explanation
of sentence). The Court clearly performed its duties in this
case, and did not make a procedural error in doing so.
Next, German Quiles argues that the District Court
failed to explain why he was sentenced to prison while his
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wife and daughter were not.22 He argues that the Court was
required to address this issue explicitly under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6). But that statute does not contain such an
“explicit” explanation requirement, and we already have
stated that the Court sufficiently explained the sentence that
was imposed. Additionally, a defendant does not have a right
to be sentenced equally with his co-defendants. See United
States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2006).
Sentencing is an individual matter. Finally, the record makes
clear that the Court saw German Quiles as the ringleader of
the criminal activity. He was the president of Aruba, Inc. and
was in charge of its compliance with the applicable
regulations with respect to money laundering. The Court
increased his offense level by two because the Court found
that he was the leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal
activity at issue. Supp. App. 1582. During sentencing, the
Court asked German Quiles “why did you involve your wife
and daughter?” Supp. App. 1618. We see no error here.
German Quiles also challenges his sentence as
substantively excessive. When a district court imposes a
sentence after a procedurally sound review, a court of appeals
will consider the sentence imposed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We cannot say that German
Quiles’s below-guideline sentence was beyond the discretion
of the District Court here.

22

German Quiles does not challenge the amount of the fine. Of
course, he does not argue that the District Court should have
imposed longer sentences on his wife and daughter.
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V. CONCLUSION
We have considered whether newly discovered
impeachment evidence, standing alone, can be the basis for a
new criminal trial, assuming all the other requirements of
Rule 33 are met. We have concluded that it can be in
situations in which the evidence is more than merely
impeaching or in which it severely undermines the credibility
of a crucial government witness whose testimony was
essential to the government’s case. Thus, there must be an
exculpatory connection between the new impeachment
evidence and the witness’s testimony at trial or the
impeachment evidence must undermine critical trial
testimony. When those connections are missing, as they are
here, or the impeachment evidence is less significant, as it is
here, the newly discovered evidence is merely impeaching
and a new trial should not be granted on its basis. For this
reason, we will affirm the District Court’s order entered on
February 25, 2009, denying a new trial. We also will affirm
the order entered on August 14, 2008, denying appellant
Gloria Quiles’s motion for a new trial. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, there was
sufficient evidence to convict her. Moreover, we will affirm
the sentence of German Quiles. The Court conducted a full
sentencing hearing and then sufficiently explained why it was
imposing a below-guideline sentence of 60 months
imprisonment.
Thus, we will affirm the judgments of
conviction and sentence entered in the District Court on
February 27, 2009, in No. 09-1667, and on March 3, 2009, in
No. 09-1686.
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